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FOR THE BIRDS: JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF EXECUTIVE
POWER IN FUND FOR ANIMALS V KEMPTHORNE
I. INTRODUCTION
A father and son bond over their shared love of nature as they
travel to observe majestic water birds thriving in their habitats.'
The pleasure they derive from the birds contrasts with the frustra-
tion of the commercial fisherman who fears that his livelihood is
threatened by the birds' ravenous appetites.2 The double-crested
cormorant is the source of these diverging emotions and competing
interests, which flew into the Second Circuit in Fund for Animals v.
Kempthorne (Fund for Animals) .
The tension between bird lovers and commercial industry over
the regulation of the cormorant population in Fund for Animals is
four-fold. 4 Both interests grappled with the United States' interna-
tional obligations to protect cormorants.5 Domestic legislation also
presented a problem in the attempt to reconcile the preservation of
the species with the protection of the United States' fisheries and
farms.6 Additionally, two procedural concerns arose pertaining to
cormorant population control.' The Second Circuit faced these is-
sues and ultimately ruled for the protection of commercial
interests.8
This Note will evaluate the Second Circuit's judgment in Fund
for Animals.9 This Note will also argue that the Second Circuit's de-
1. The Double-crested Cormorant, NAT'L AUDUBON Soc'v, http://www.audubon.
org/bird/BoA/F41_Glb.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Double-
crested Cormorant] (detailing father and son journey).
2. Fund for Animals v. Kempthorne, 538 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2008) (describing
effects of cormorant feeding on commercial activity).
3. See id. at 126 (discussing conflicting interests of bird lovers and federal leg-
islation protecting industry).
4. For a full outline of the four legal issues in Fund for Animals, see infra notes
33-37 and accompanying text.
5. For a complete discussion of international treaties protecting cormorants,
see infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
6. For a further discussion of domestic legislation protecting birds, see infra
notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
7. For a detailed treatment of the procedural laws involved in the implemen-
tation of the Public Resource Depredation Order, see infta notes 75-103 and ac-
companying text.
8. For a narrative analysis of the Second Circuit's holding in Fund for Animals,
see infra notes 126-52 and accompanying text.
9. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 138 (stating Second Circuit's holding).
(31)
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cision represents an expansion of executive power by the judici-
ary.10 Part II provides a backdrop for this Note's treatment of Fund
for Animals by discussing the cormorant species along with the argu-
ments against government regulation of the birds." Part III details
the legal background and precedent upon which the Second Cir-
cuit relied in rendering its decision.' 2 Part IV presents the court's
application of this law and its rationale in arriving at its holding.' 3
Part V critiques the court's decision and argues that it represents an
extension of executive power.14 Finally, Part VI discusses both the
broad impact the Second Circuit's decision will have on all types of




Double-crested cormorants are large water birds native to
North America. 16 These birds are known for their black feathers
and contrasting bright orange faces and bills.' 7 The cormorant
population, estimated at two million birds, largely resides in the
Great Lakes region.18 The birds feed mainly on small fish and vege-
tation, but their large appetites are grounds for concern among
commercial fishermen.' 9 Cormorants can cause widespread depre-
10. For a critical analysis of the court's decision in Fund for Animals, see infra
notes 153-83 and accompanying text.
11. For the full factual background, see infra notes 16-40 and accompanying
text.
12. For the complete legal background, see infra notes 41-125 and accompa-
nying text.
13. For a full narrative analysis of the court's holding in Fund for Animals, see
infra notes 126-52 and accompanying text.
14. For a detailed critique of the court's holding in Fund for Animals, see infra
notes 153-83 and accompanying text.
15. For a complete treatment of the impact of the court's decision, see infra
notes 184-212 and accompanying text.
16. Indicator: Double-crested Cormorant Population Changes, EPA, http://www.epa.
gov/med/grosseile-site/indicators/cormorants.html (last updated Aug. 26, 2009)
[hereinafter Indicator] (identifying cormorant species and locations).
17. See id. (describing physical attributes of cormorants).
18. See id. (stating species' dominance in Great Lakes region of North
America). Approximately two million double-crested cormorants live in North
America, and seventy percent of them reside in the continent's interior. Id. Cor-
morants also reside in Florida, Mexico, Alaska, North Carolina, and along the
coasts. Double-crested Cormorant, supra note 1 (discussing range of cormorant
habitats).
19. See Indicator, supra note 16 (discussing dietary habits of cormorants and
their impact on commercial fishing industry). Cormorants mainly consume small
fish, such as yellow perch, but also feed on bass. Id. Since the early 1980s, cormo-
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dation of fisheries by consuming large quantities of fish.20 When
the birds gather in large flocks, they essentially wreak havoc on fish
populations and the commercial industries dependant upon
them.21
The cormorant population suffered a sharp decline from the
1950s through the 1970s.2 2 During this time, human persecution of
the birds was prevalent, accounting for a large number of cormo-
rant deaths.23 From the 1970s through the 2000s, the birds enjoyed
a population growth; after Congress passed legislation protecting
the species, cormorant killings by humans notably decreased. 24
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), however,
predicts that 2007 marked the beginning of another period of cor-
morant population decline.25
The EPA's prediction of a modern decline in the number of
double-crested cormorants finds support in places like California. 26
Since 1989, the number of breeding cormorants in Northern Cali-
fornia's Bay Area has declined by ninety percent.27 Such solid evi-
rants have been a nuisance in the Great Lakes region because of their high levels
of fish consumption. Id.
20. See id. (listing cormorants' adverse effects on fisheries). In addition to
harming commercial fisheries, large cormorant gatherings threaten the vegetation
of the Great Lakes region. Id. Additionally, the population can take over the habi-
tats of other waterbird species. Id.
21. See Fund for Animals v. Kempthorne, 538 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2008) (ex-
plaining consequences of large numbers of cormorants). The Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) has received a growing number of complaints over the last few de-
cades from fishermen and aquaculture facilities that the growing cormorant popu-
lation is plundering their fish crops. Id.
22. See Indicator, supra note 16 (documenting cormorant population decline).
23. See id. (discussing causes of cormorant decline). Widespread use of the
pesticide DDT also contributed to the decrease in the population because it
caused reproductive failure within the species. Id.
24. See id. (discussing causes of cormorant population increase). In addition
to protective legislation, a decline in commercial fishing and the prohibition of
DDT contributed to the revival of the cormorant population. Id.
25. See id. (stating EPA's prediction of another decline in cormorant popula-
tion). The EPA cites a drop in the availability of the cormorants' food sources and
an increase in management projects aimed at reducing the population as the two
main reasons for the species' decline. Id.
26. PRBO Conservation Science, Double-Crested Cormorants in Sharp Decline,
YUBANET.COM (Sept. 1, 2009), http://yubanet.com/california/Double-crested-Cor-
morants-in-Sharp-Decline.php (documenting state of cormorant population in
California).
27. See id. (quantifying decline in Bay Area cormorants). Researchers contrib-
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dence of cormorant decline is cause for concern among bird lovers,
who brought their anguish to court in Fund for AnimalS.28
B. Bird Lovers' Plight in Court
The plaintiffs in this case consisted of bird-watching organiza-
tions and individuals concerned about New York's cormorant popu-
lation.29 They filed a complaint against federal officials, including
then-Secretary of the Interior Dirk Kempthorne, challenging the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's (FWS) recent decision to allow vari-
ous agencies to kill cormorants in an effort to preserve public re-
sources.30 The FWS's Public Resource Depredation Order
(Depredation Order) authorized state fish and wildlife agencies to
take cormorants without a license in an effort to prevent the depre-
dation of fish, wildlife, and plants by the birds.31 The FWS passed
this and other similar orders to protect commercial fishing interests
from the cormorants' insatiable appetites.32
The plaintiffs alleged that the Depredation Order violates vari-
ous legal obligations of the United States government.33 Specifi-
cally, the plaintiffs cited four areas of concern.34 First, they argued
that the Depredation Order violates the United States' interna-
tional treaty obligations with Mexico.35 Second, the plaintiffs con-
tended that the Depredation Order violated the Migratory Bird
28. See Fund for Animals v. Kempthorne, 538 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2008)
(describing plaintiffs' affinity for bird watching).
29. See id. (identifying plaintiffs).
30. See id. at 131 (describing plaintiffs' action against FWS). For a full outline
of the plaintiffs' allegations, see infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
31. See id. at 130 (discussing provisions of Depredation Order). To "take" a
bird means to hunt, shoot, trap, or kill it. Id. at 127 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 10.12
(2009)). Specifically, the Depredation Order requires that agents first use non-
lethal control methods and take only cormorants. 50 C.F.R. § 21.48(d) (1) (2009).
Agents must also give the FWS written notice when they intend to act pursuant to
the Depredation Order. Id. § 21.48(d) (9) (2009). Additionally, the agents must
provide the FWS with an annual report that documents their work under the Dep-
redation Order. Id. § 21.48(d)(10)-(11) (2009).
32. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 128 (discussing FWS's motivation in pass-
ing Order). For a discussion of the impact of cormorant flocks on fisheries and
vegetation, see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
33. See id. at 126-27 (listing Order's violation of federal laws and international
treaties).
34. See id. (discussing legal violations).
35. See id. at 134 (explaining plaintiffs' Mexico Convention argument). For a
detailed treatment of the United States' obligations under the Mexico Convention,
see infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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Treaty Act.3 6 Finally, the plaintiffs asserted that the FWS failed to
comply with two procedural statutes, the Administrative Procedure
Act and the National Environmental Policy Act, when it imple-
mented the Depredation Order.3 7
The District Court for the Southern District of New York dis-
missed the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.38 The plain-
tiffs appealed this holding to the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.3 9 The Second Circuit subsequently affirmed the district
court's ruling in favor of the defendants. 40
III. BACKGROUND
A. Pre-Depredation Order Regulation of Cormorants
The Public Resource Depredation Order is just one regulation
in a history of legislation pertaining to both the control and protec-
tion of cormorants.4 1 Since the early twentieth century, the United
States has become a party to a number of international treaties that
protect migratory birds, including cormorants. 42 The Convention
between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals
(Mexico Convention), first enacted in 1936, is one such treaty.4 3
The Mexico Convention requires the United States and Mex-
ico to establish "close seasons," periods in which the nations cannot
take birds. 4 4 The treaty protects migratory game birds, such as pi-
36. See id. at 132 (describing plaintiffs' reasons why Order violates MBTA).
For a discussion of the plaintiffs' MBTA allegations, see infra note 135 and accom-
panying text.
37. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 126 (listing federal procedural statutes
plaintiffs argue Order violates).
38. See id. at 131 (discussing procedural history of noted case and district
court's holding). The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. Id.
39. See id. at 126 (relating basis for plaintiffs' appeal).
40. See id. at 138 (stating Second Circuit's affirmation of district court's
holding).
41. See id. at 126-28 (providing overview of pre-Depredation Order cormorant
legislation).
42. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 126-27 (listing international treaties be-
tween United States and other countries). The United States entered into bird
protection treaties with numerous European countries, including the United King-
dom, Ireland, and the Soviet Union. Id. at 126. The United States has also signed
similar treaties with Japan and Canada. Id.
43. See id. at 126-27 (naming Mexico Convention as one international treaty
for bird protection).
44. Convention between the United States of America and the United Mexi-
can States for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, U.S.-Mex.,
art. II(A), Feb. 7, 1936, 50 Stat. 1311 [hereinafter Mexico Convention] (describing
close seasons requirement). In addition to requiring close seasons, the Mexico
2011] 35
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geons and ducks, and migratory non-game birds, such as cuckoos. 45
The Convention explicitly lists the bird species that fit into these
categories.46 In 1972, the parties amended the Convention to spe-
cifically include cormorants as a species of protected birds, but did
not specify whether cormorants are game or non-game birds.47
The judiciary affords great deference to the Executive branch
in the interpretation of treaties such as the Mexico Convention.48
The United States Supreme Court declared this deference require-
ment in El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng (El Al Israel Air-
lines).49 In this case, the airline subjected the passenger to an
intrusive strip search, and the passenger sued for damages stem-
ming from his psychic and psychosomatic injuries.50 The airline
argued that only bodily injury imposes air carrier liability under the
Warsaw Convention.5 1 The United States submitted an amicus cu-
rie supporting the petitioner's argument.52 The Court agreed with
the airline, deferring to the United States government's interpreta-
tion of the Warsaw Convention as requiring bodily injury for
liability.53
Executive deference is not the judiciary's only treaty interpreta-
tion tactic; the Supreme Court articulated another option in Chev-
ron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Chevron).54
Convention mandates a maximum four-month hunting season and a permit re-
quirement. Id. For a definition of "take," see supra note 31.
45. See id. at art. IV (classifying birds protected under Mexico Convention).
The Convention lists the bird species by their scientific names. Id.
46. See id. (categorizing bird species as migratory game or migratory non-
game birds). Id. Article IV also gives the United States and Mexican governments
the right to place other birds into these categories. Id. Such amendment can only
occur by common agreement between the two countries. Id.
47. Agreement between the Government of the United Mexican States and
the Government of the United States of America Amending Article 4 of the Con-
vention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, U.S.-Mex., Mar.
10, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 260 [hereinafter Amendments] (adding cormorants to Mexico
Convention's protection).
48. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 134 (stressingjudicial deference to Execu-
tive branch's interpretation of treaties).
49. 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999) (holding that respect is due to executive treaty
interpretation).
50. El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 164 (1999)
(describing passenger's claim against airline and damages sought). The passenger
claimed assault and false imprisonment. Id.
51. Id. at 160 (describing airline's argument). The Warsaw Convention gov-
erns airline liability for all international travel. Id.
52. See id. at 168 (discussing federal government's amicus curie).
53. See id. at 168-69 (stating Court's holding). The Court declared that re-
spect is due to the Executive branch's reasonable interpretations of international
treaties. Id. at 168.
54. 467 U.S. 837, 839-42 (1984) (providing factual overview of case).
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There, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) challenged
an EPA regulation promulgated under the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977.55 This regulation permitted power plants to install
equipment that failed to meet certain conditions if the machinery
did not increase the plant's total air pollution level.5 6 The regula-
tion also relaxed conditions by grouping all pollution-emitting
equipment into one industrial category, known as "stationary
sources."57
The NRDC argued that this grouping of all machinery into the
stationary source category exceeded the EPA's power.58 The Su-
preme Court disagreed and upheld the regulation. 5 9 The Court
stated that the judiciary must not confine itself to executive defer-
ence; courts must also consider other factors, such as legislative his-
tories, when interpreting statutory provisions.60
In addition to its international obligations to protect cormo-
rants, the United State has domestic duties under the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) .61 The MBTA makes it illegal to take birds
protected under the Mexico Convention and other treaties.62 The
act also grants the authority to designate appropriate times for tak-
ings of other birds to the Secretary of the Interior.63 In turn, the
Secretary of the Interior has delegated this authority to the FWS. 64
55. See Chevron, US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 840-41 (describing challenge to Amendments).
56. See id. at 840 (detailing changes to regulation). The new regulation ap-
plied only in states that had previously failed to meet the EPA's national air quality
standards. Id. at 83940.
57. See id. (describing regulation's new industrial grouping). A stationary
source is any structure, facility, building, or installation that contributes to air pol-
lution and must meet the requirements of the Clean Air Act. Id. The regulation
permitted qualifying states to classify entire plants as stationary sources. Id. Be-
cause of this broad grouping, the entire plant was subject to the more lenient
requirements of the new regulation. Id.
58. See id. at 84041 (outlining Council's challenge to Amendments). Accord-
ing to the Court, the issue in this case was whether the EPA's regulation, granting
states the power to classify entire plants as stationary sources, was based on a rea-
sonable construction of "stationary source." Id. at 840.
59. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (stating Court's holding).
60. See id. at 859-66 (discussing factors Court considered in arriving at hold-
ing). In addition to legislative history, the Court analyzed the statutory language
and the policy considerations behind the Amendments to determine the reasona-
ble construction of "stationary source." Id.
61. See generally Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2006)
(codifying federal regulations regarding cormorants).
62. Id. § 703(a) (declaring taking of protected bird species unlawful).
63. Id. § 704 (delegating authority to take to Secretary of Interior).
64. 50 C.F.R. § 10.1 (2009) (permitting Secretary's subdelegation of authority
to take to FWS).
2011] 37
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Such delegation of authority has been a contested issue in
American jurisprudence, particularly in United States Telecom Ass'n v.
FCC (United States Telecom).65 In that case, several telecommunica-
tion carriers challenged the Telecommunications Act of 1996.66
This act required incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to
make network elements available to new carriers known as competi-
tive local exchange carriers (CLECs).67 Congress believed that this
provision would make it easier for new carriers to enter the mar-
ket.6 8 The Telecommunications Act vested the power to require
ILECs to make the network elements available in the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC).69 The act also permitted the
Commission to subdelegate the power to make impairment deter-
minations to state commissions.70
The ILECs argued that the Telecommunications Act's subdele-
gation to state commissions was an unconstitutional delegation of
power.7' The D.C. Circuit held that subdelegations to outside par-
ties are only permissible upon a showing of a reasonable connec-
tion between the government and the outside parties' decisions in
the situation.72 Within this framework, the court concluded, the
Telecommunications Act's subdelegation was unconstitutional be-
cause it lacked a reasonable connection between the FCC and the
65. 359 F.3d 554, 567-68 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (providing guidelines for delegation
of authority).
66. See U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 560 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (outlining
ILECs' objections to Telecommunications Act).
67. See id. (describing ILECs' duties under Telecommunications Act). CLECs
are competitive local exchange carriers. Id. at 561. The act imposed a duty on
ILECs to provide unbundled and nondiscriminatory access to network elements to
other carriers, including CLECs, at a reasonable rate. Telecommunications Act, 47
U.S.C. § 251(c) (3) (d) (2006).
68. See U.S. Telecom, 359 F.3d at 560 (stating aim of Telecommunications Act).
This act was a congressional attempt to increase competition within the telecom-
munications industry. Id. at 561.
69. See id. at 561 (explaining FCC's power under Telecommunications Act).
70. See id. (addressing FCC's power to subdelegate to state commissions).
The authority to determine impairment under the Telecommunications Act is the
power to decide which network elements are to be made available to the CLECs.
Id. The FCC's subdelegation authority is rooted in the text of the act, which pro-
vides that the Commission will not preclude any act or decision of a state commis-
sion that fulfills three standards. 47 U.S.C. § 251(d) (3) (2006). These decisions
must: 1) establish network access to local exchange carriers; 2) be consistent with
the act; and 3) not substantially prevent the act's implementation. See id.
§ 251 (d) (3) (A)-(C).
71. See U.S. Telecom, 359 F.3d at 565 (stating ILECs' objection to Telecommu-
nications Act's subdelegation of authority to state commissions).
72. See id. at 567 (articulating standard for permissible subdelegation of
authority).
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state commissions' decisions.73 Rather, the FCC delegated author-
ity to resolve an entire issue to the state commissions, leaving states
without any FCC decision to connect to.7 4
B. Procedural Requirements of the Depredation Order's
Implementation
Procedural concerns, in addition to international treaty and
statutory matters, affected the implementation of the Depredation
Order in this case.75 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is
one procedural law governing cormorant regulation.76 The APA
prohibits agencies from acting arbitrarily or capriciously in the ex-
ercise of their duties.77 If a court determines that an agency has
acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner, it can set aside the ac-
tions and deem them unlawful.78 The Supreme Court defined the
standard for determining arbitrariness in Motor Vehicles Manufactur-
ers. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (Motor Vehicles
Manufacturers Ass'n). 7 In that case, the insurance companies chal-
lenged an action of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion (NHTSA) as arbitrary and capricious.80
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
vests the power to issue motor vehicle safety regulations in the Sec-
retary of Transportation or a delegate in the NHTSA. 8' In 1972,
73. See id. at 567-68 (analyzing lack of connection between FCC and state
commission decisions as basis for court's holding).
74. See id. (arguing that subdelegation under Telecommunications Act fails to
establish reasonable connection with FCC action).
75. For a narrative analysis of the Second Circuit's treatment of the procedu-
ral challenges to the Depredation Order, see infra notes 140-52 and accompanying
text.
76. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (providing
judiciary with authority to govern agency action).
77. See id. § 2(a) (vesting power to determine nature of agency actions in
courts).
78. See id. (permitting courts to set aside unlawful agency actions). In addi-
tion to prohibiting arbitrary or capricious behavior, the APA bans agency action
that violates constitutional rights and powers, exceeds statutory protections, does
not properly observe procedural laws, is not supported by the facts of a given case,
or otherwise violates the APA. See id. § (2) (a)-(f). While courts may set aside these
types of actions, the act also empowers courts to force an agency to act when it
determines that the agency has unlawfully or unreasonably delayed appropriate
action. See id. § (1).
79. 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (establishing arbitrariness standard).
80. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Aut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 39-
40 (1983) (stating insurance companies' objections to NHTSA action).
81. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. § 1381
(1976 & Supp. 1976) (authorizing Secretary of Transportation to issue safety regu-
lations). The purpose of the Act was to prevent injuries and deaths arising from
auto accidents. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 33. Under the act, the Secre-
2011] 39
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the NHTSA used this authority to enact Standard 208, which re-
quired automakers to install seatbelts and passive restraint systems,
such as airbags, in all vehicles.82 Nine years later, the NHTSA
rescinded Standard 208's passive restraint requirement with the is-
suance of Notice 25.83 Andrew Lewis, then-Secretary of Transporta-
tion, cited two reasons for this rescission: economic difficulties
facing the automobile industry and more recent NHTSA studies
that failed to show these systems provided any major safety
benefits.84
Insurance companies sued to challenge the NHTSA's rescis-
sion of the passive restraint requirement.85 The D.C. Circuit found
that the NHTSA's rescission was arbitrary and capricious under the
APA.86 The United States Supreme Court subsequently affirmed.87
In its decision, the Court articulated the standard for determining
whether an agency has acted arbitrarily or capriciously in violation
of the APA. 88 An agency acts this way if it studies information rele-
tary or NHTSA delegate must consider automobile safety data, the reasonableness
of the proposed standard for particular vehicles, and how well the proposal will
carry out the act's purpose. Id. at 33-34.
82. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 34-37 (discussing legislative his-
tory of Standard 208). Standard 208 has a lengthy legislative history comprised of
sixty lawmaking actions. Id. at 34. As used in Standard 208, a passive occupant
restraint system is a safety mechanism that protects the driver or passenger without
any action on their part, aside from the normal operation of the car. Id. at 34-35.
In addition to airbags, passive restraints include automatic seatbelts. Id. at 35. In
1977, the NHTSA estimated that passive restraints had the potential to prevent
12,000 deaths and over 100,000 injuries every year. Id.
83. See id. at 38 (discussing NHTSA's rescission of passive restraint
requirement).
84. See id. at 38-39 (detailing agency's decision to rescind passive require-
ment). The NHTSA concluded that the installation of passive systems would cost
the auto industry approximately $1 billion. Id. at 39. Moreover, the agency con-
cluded that this cost was unreasonable when compared with the system's decreased
safety benefits. Id.
85. See id. at 39 (stating petition of insurance companies.) Specifically, State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. and the National Association of Indepen-
dent Insurers filed petitions for review of the rescission. Id.
86. See id. (explaining court's holding). The D.C. Circuit gave three reasons
for its determination: a lack of support for the NHTSA's prediction that the sys-
tems would not be used; the NHTSA's failure to consider whether automakers
would install different types of passive belts; and the NHTSA's negligence in ana-
lyzing the benefits of airbags. Id. at 39-40.
87. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 46 (stating Court's holding).
88. See id. at 43 (citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156,
168 (1962)). For a full discussion of Burlington Trucks, see infta notes 199-200 and
accompanying text.
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vant to the action it is taking and fails to provide a rational connec-
tion between the information and its chosen course of action.89
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is a second
procedural law governing the implementation of cormorant regula-
tions.90 The NEPA requires agencies to prepare an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) before passing any order, such as the cor-
morant regulations, that might affect the environment.9 1 An EIS
includes the environmental impact of a proposed action and any
alternatives to the action.92 While the NEPA addresses the ele-
ments to be contained in an EIS, it is silent on the exact level of
detail required in the statement.93 The Second Circuit determined
this level of detail in County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior (County of
Suffolk).9
In 1974, President Jimmy Carter proposed a massive lease of
the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) to private industries for oil and
gas production.95 Pursuant to this proposal, the Secretary of the
89. See Motor Vehicles Mfts. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43 (stating arbitrariness stan-
dard). In articulating this standard, the Court presented various circumstances
which demonstrate an agency's failure to provide a rational connection between
information and its chosen action. Id. These circumstances include the agency
neglecting to consider a key aspect of the issue; the agency's decision counteract-
ing the information available to it; and the agency's action being so implausible
that it is not due to simply a difference in view. Id.
90. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006) (de-
claring purpose of Act). The NEPA serves four congressional purposes. Id. First, it
codifies a national policy to promote peace between the citizenry and the environ-
ment. Id. Second, the NEPA promotes the protection of the environment in con-
junction with the advancement of the welfare of mankind. Id. Third, it increases
the understanding of the ecosystems of the United States. Id. Finally, the NEPA
establishes a Council on Environmental Quality. Id.
91. See id. § 4321(2) (c) (mandating EIS preparation).
92. See id. § 4321(2) (C) (i) (requiring EIS to include actual and potential envi-
ronmental impacts); see also id. §4321(2) (C) (iii) (listing EIS components). An EIS
also includes any unavoidable adverse effects of the action and any irreversible use
of resources by the proposed action. Id. §4321(2)(C)(ii); see also id.
§ 4321(2) (C) (v). The statute additionally requires the EIS to address the relation-
ship between the action's short-term environmental strains and the long-term pro-
ductivity benefits. Id. § 4321(2) (C) (v).
93. See id. § 4321(2) (C) (listing required parts of EIS).
94. 562 F.2d 1368, 1379 (2d Cir. 1977) (establishing required level of detail in
EIS).
95. See County of Suffolk v. Sec'y of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (2d Cir. 1977)
(describing Presidential proposal). The OCS encompasses underwater lands, soil,
and seabed 200 nautical miles off the coasts of the United States. See OCS Alterna-
tive Energy and Alternate Use Programmatic EIS Information Center, THE OUTER CONri-
NENTAL SHELF, http://ocsenergy.anl.gov/guide/ocs/index.cfm (last visited Nov.
25, 2010). The OCS represents the intersection between the federal government's
seaward jurisdiction and that of the states. Id. Notably, however, the federal gov-
ernment owns the OCS. County of Suffolk, 562 F.2d at 1372. The President pro-
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Interior prepared an EIS and adopted a leasing schedule.96 Under
this schedule, the Bureau of Land Management designated areas
within the OCS for lease and specifically designated fifty to ninety
miles off the New Jersey coast as Sale 40.97 The Bureau then pre-
pared a four-volume EIS for this area.98 The Secretary of the Inte-
rior quickly approved the lease for Sale 40.99
New York's Suffolk and Nassau counties challenged the ade-
quacy of the Sale 40 EIS and sued to enjoin the sale in district
court.100 Specifically, the counties argued that the EIS violated the
NEPA by not adequately addressing the impact of pipeline routes in
the lease area.101 The district court held that the EIS violated the
NEPA and declared the lease null and void.102 The Second Circuit
reversed, holding that the EIS was sufficient under the NEPA be-
cause this act does not require an EIS to address every possible re-
sult of a proposed action.103
posed the OCS lease program because of the nation's urgent need for energy at
the time. Id. at 1373.
96. See County of Suffolk, 562 F.2d at 1373 (detailing Secretary's actions in ac-
cordance with Presidential proposal). The Secretary's EIS addressed the lease's
basic environmental impacts and considered alternative energy sources, such as
conservation and geothermal energy. Id.
97. See id. (providing background on lease area selection process).
98. See id. (detailing Sale 40 EIS preparation process). State representatives
and federal agencies contributed to the final draft of the EIS. Id. Moreover, 137
witnesses testified in preparation hearings for the EIS. Id. All of this input re-
sulted in the 1,998-page Sale 40 EIS. Id.
99. See id. (elaborating on Secretary's implementation of Sale 40). The Secre-
tary implemented the sale after approving a Program Decision Option Document
and conducting several staff meetings. Id.
100. See id. (explaining suit to enjoin sale). Other parties joined an earlier
action filed by Suffolk and Nassau counties. Id. The other plaintiffs were the Na-
tional Resources Defense Council, the State of New York, and numerous Long
Island counties. Id. The plaintiffs contended that the EIS violated the NEPA. Id.
101. See County of Suffolk, 562 F.2d at 1374 (addressing issues with pipeline
routes in EIS). The court held sua sponte that the EIS had not adequately consid-
ered pipeline risk and granted a preliminary injunction before hearing the case.
Id.
102. See id. (discussing district court's holding). The court found the EIS in-
adequate for three reasons. Id. First, the EIS did not address pipeline routes in
the area. Id. Second, the EIS erred in overestimating the area's production capac-
ity while underestimating the project's costs. Id. Lastly, the EIS failed to address
the process of selecting pipeline tract routes or the alternatives of using less haz-
ardous tracts. Id.
103. See id. at 1379 (detailing Second Circuit's analysis). The court held that
requiring the EIS to include every pipeline route would demand too much specu-
lation and hypothesizing. Id. This requirement, the court explained, was akin to
requiring an EIS for a highway to include routes that might never exist to places
unknown. Id.
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C. The FWS's Earlier Regulation of Cormorants
The Depredation Order at issue in Fund forAnimalsjoins a rich
line of FWS attempts to control cormorants.10 4 Prior to the Depre-
dation Order, the FWS required any person seeking to take migra-
tory birds committing depredation to apply for a permit.1 05 The
agency issued permits only to those applicants who met a detailed
list of application requirements.1 0 6 The permits were highly condi-
tional and dictated both the methods used to kill the birds and the
proper procedures for their disposal.107
The FWS did not limit cormorant control to the permit pro-
cess, however.108 The agency would alternatively issue broad depre-
dation orders that demanded a taking.109 This alternative was
reserved for emergency situations only, and the FWS required a
showing of immediate and serious depredation.o10 These orders
imposed higher restrictions on taking methods than the typical per-
104. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 127-31 (providing overview of FWS cor-
morant regulations).
105. See id. at 128 (discussing permit requirement). The FWS requires people
to obtain permits before taking, possessing, or moving migratory birds to avoid
depredation. 50 C.F.R. § 21.41(a) (2009). The FWS also mandates that people
obtain a permit if they wish to herd endangered migratory birds or bald eagles for
depredation control. Id.
106. See id. § 21.41(b) (listing permit application requirements). A permit
application must include a description of where the depredation is happening; a
list of the wildlife or vegetation at risk from the depredation; and a description of
the extent of the damage to these interests. Id. § 21.41(b)(1)-(3). Additionally,
the application must name the migratory bird species that is committing the dep-
redation. Id. § 21.41 (b) (4).
107. Id. § 21.41(c) (stating permit conditions). The permit requirements spe-
cifically dictate that a person use a shotgun smaller than a No. 10 gauge, fired from
the shoulder, to take birds. Id. § 21.41(c) (2). People may only take birds found
within the area specified in the permit. Id. Additionally, the FWS prohibits the use
of decoys to lure birds. Id. § 21.41(c)(3). People must turn over the taken birds to
the FWS, which then gives the birds to charities for use as food. Id. § 21.41 (c) (4).
Finally, the FWS limits the tenure of the permits to less than one year. Id.
§21.41(5) (d).
108. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 128 (discussing alternative authorization
for migratory bird takings).
109. 50 C.F.R. § 21.42 (2009) (granting permission to FWS to order
mandatory takings).
110. See id. (highlighting emergency nature of broad depredation orders).
The statute explicitly states that such an order can only exist upon a showing that
migratory birds have converged and are about to cause serious depredation to
agriculture, horticulture, or fishing interests. Id.
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mit.11 Additionally, the FWS established statutory procedures for
issuing depredation orders for specific bird species.112
In 1998, after receiving extensive complaints about cormorant
depredation from commercial fishing interests, the FWS adopted
the Aquaculture Depredation Order.113 This order permitted the
aquaculture industry to conduct cormorant takings without a per-
mit.11 4 Yet, the FWS authorized these takings only under limited
circumstances and in restricted locations."15
D. Building the Nest: The Research and Preparation Behind the
Public Resource Depredation Order
The FWS permit procedures and the Aquaculture Depredation
Order proved insufficient in controlling the United States' cormo-
rant population.116 With more and more complaints flooding the
agency, the FWS issued a Notice of Intent in 1999 to undertake a
nation-wide cormorant management plan.' 7 The agency also pro-
duced an EIS for the plan and established a "Cormorant Team" to
oversee the management of the birds." 8 The team's first duty was
to produce a more complete draft EIS for the project, which it
made available for public comment in 2001."19 This EIS proposed
111. See id. § 21.42(b) (limiting time allowed for depredation). The FWS has
the discretion to determine the tenure of the order. Id. The orders limit the tak-
ings to those areas that the FWS has determined to be threatened locations. Id.
§ 21.42(a).
112. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 128 (discussing availability of depreda-
tion orders particular to bird species).
113. See id. (classifying complaints as reason for Aquaculture Depredation Or-
der). For a discussion of the harmful effects of groups of cormorants on fisheries,
see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
114. See id. (discussing FWS's adoption of Aquaculture Depredation Order).
This order permitted cormorant takings without permits if the birds were commit-
ting depredation on aquaculture stocks. 50 C.F.R. § 21.47(c) (2009). The U.S.
aquaculture industry includes various plant and animal species, such as salmon,
catfish, shrimp, tilapia, and alligators. NAA Facts, NATIONAL AQUACULTURE ASSOCIA-
TION, http://www.thenaa.net (last visited Nov. 26, 2010).
115. 50 C.F.R. § 21.47(d)(2)-(9) (2010) (listing required conditions). The
Aquaculture Depredation Order was applicable in only thirteen states. Id.
§ 21.47(b). The Depredation Order in Fund for Animals broadened the Aquacul-
ture Depredation Order. Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 128.
116. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 128 (discussing increase in complaints
from commercial farmers).
117. See id. at 128-29 (presenting FWS's Notice of Intent).
118. See id. at 129 (describing EIS and Cormorant Team). This team was
comprised of FWS staff members from different offices and worked with the De-
partment of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service to develop
ways to control the cormorant population. Id.
119. See id. (discussing draft EIS).
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six possibilities for controlling cormorant depredation, including
the passage of a new depredation order. 120
The team endorsed the possibility of a new order that would
allow state agencies to develop their own cormorant management
plans under FWS supervision. 121 Pursuant to this recommendation,
the FWS proposed the Public Resource Depredation Order in
March 2003.122 The proposed order contained slight modifications
from the team's recommended order, including a reduction in the
number of states where the Depredation Order would permit tak-
ings.123 The Depredation Order was the result of exhaustive re-
search on the breeding, traveling, and growth patterns of the
birds. 124 The FWS produced the final Public Resource Depreda-
tion Order on October 8, 2003.125
IV. NARRTIvE ANALYSIS
A. The Depredation Order vs. the Mexico Convention
The Second Circuit, applying the deference to executive inter-
pretation rule from El Al Israel Airlines, held that the Depredation
Order does not violate the United States' obligations under the
Mexico Convention.126 The Mexico Convention does not explicitly
state whether the close seasons requirement applies to all migratory
birds or only migratory game birds.'27 Article II(A) addresses mi-
120. See id. (listing draft EIS's cormorant control proposals). The six propos-
als were: 1) not changing the existing system; 2) using only non-lethal manage-
ment tactics; 3) expanding the existing system; 4) issuing a new depredation order;
5) reducing the regional cormorant population; and 6) designating a cormorant
hunting season. Id.
121. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 129 (discussing team's recommenda-
tion). The purpose of the new order would be to provide public resource manage-
ment with more flexibility in controlling the cormorant population while
guaranteeing federal oversight of the control policies. Id.
122. See id. (describing proposed Public Resource Depredation Order).
123. See id. (differentiating FWS's proposed Order from team's recommenda-
tion). The FWS's proposal reduced the number of states from forty-eight to
twenty-four. Id. In addition, the Depredation Order specified the agencies it ap-
plied to, limited its applicability to land and freshwater only, and expanded the
number of available methods of taking cormorants. Id.
124. See id. at 130 (describing FWS studies).
125. See id. (discussing publication of Order). For a full discussion of the pro-
visions of the Depredation Order, see supra note 31.
126. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 134-35 (stating court's Mexico Conven-
tion holding). For a full discussion of El Al Isr. Airlines, see supra notes 49-53 and
accompanying text.
127. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 134 (discussing Mexico Convention's
silence on whether close seasons requirement applies to all migratory birds).
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gratory bird takings, but not the taking of "all" migratory birds.128
This ambiguity, the court reasoned, leaves open the issue of
whether the close seasons requirement applies to cormorants be-
cause cormorants are migratory, non-game birds.'29 The Second
Circuit recognized that arguments could be made supporting an
interpretation of Article II(A) protecting all migratory birds or pro-
tecting only migratory game birds.130 Pursuant to the judicial tradi-
tion of executive deference, the court sided with the FWS,
deferring to its interpretation that the close seasons requirement
applies only to migratory game birds.'13 In accordance with the
Supreme Court's decision in El Al Israel Airlines, the Second Circuit
deferred to the FWS's interpretation of the Convention because it
was reasonable.132 With the close season requirement not applying
to non-game cormorants, the court held that the Depredation Or-
der does not need to abide by this regulation and, therefore, does
not violate the Mexico Convention when it fails to consider close
seasons. 33
B. The Depredation Order vs. the MBTA
The Second Circuit also affirmed the district court's finding
that the Depredation Order does not violate the MBTA."M The
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the FWS's grant of per-
mission to state fish and wildlife agencies to determine cormorant
128. See id. (addressing ambiguity of Article II(A)). For a further discussion
of the Article II close seasons requirement, see supra note 44 and accompanying
text.
129. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 134-35 (discussing court's belief that
Article II(A) may or may not apply to cormorants).
130. See id. (detailing opposing arguments regarding cormorant protection
under Article II). The court first presented the arguments for excluding non-
game birds from protection under Article II(A). Id. The language of Article II
itself favors this exclusion because it discusses the taking of migratory birds, not all
migratory birds. Id. at 134. Article 11(C) refers back to this provision when it states
the minimum length of a close hunting season, further supporting the exclusion
of non-game birds. Id. Because Article IV distinguishes between game and non-
game birds, the court reasoned that the parties to the treaty were aware of this
distinction and choose not to include non-game birds under Article II(A). Id. at
135. This argument, however, can support the opposite view that Article II(A)
protects non-game birds, as the state parties could have believed that the distinc-
tion was implied in Article II. Id. Finally, the court recognized that Article II's text
does not disprove this article's applicability to non-game migratory birds. Id.
131. See id. 134-35 (stating court's Article 1I(A) interpretation).
132. See id. at 135 (describing Second Circuit's application of executive defer-
ence rule).
133. See id. at 134-35 (elaborating on court's executive deference reasoning).
134. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 132 (stating Second Circuit's MBTA
holding). For a discussion of the procedural history of the noted case, see supra
notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
16
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol22/iss1/2
FOR THE BiRDs
takings violates the MBTA. 3 5 Moreover, the court held that this
permission does not rise to the level of a delegation of authority
because the Depredation Order gives state agencies very limited
discretion.1 3 6
These discretionary limits, the court reasoned, render the Dep-
redation Order a permissible subdelegation of power.1 37 This sub-
delegation represents a reasonable connection between the state
agencies' actions and the FWS's determinations because the order
simply permits state agencies to make more localized determina-
tions for the FWS.138 As such, the Depredation Order passes the
reasonable connection delegation test from United States Telecom
and, therefore, does not violate the MBTA. 39
C. Lack of Arbitrary and Capricious Action Under the APA
The Second Circuit declared that the FWS did not act arbitrar-
ily or capriciously when it implemented the Depredation Order
and, thus, did not violate the APA.x40 Prior to passing the Depreda-
tion Order, the FWS conducted studies pertaining to the depreda-
tion effects of cormorant populations on the environment.14 1
These studies proved that cormorants caused harm to public re-
135. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 132 (dismissing plaintiffs MBTA
argument).
136. See id. at 133 (providing court's rationale for holding Order is not dele-
gation of authority). The Depredation Order restricts the species, locations, and
means by which the state agencies can take cormorants. Id. Additionally, the FWS
still holds some authority over the cormorant takings under the Depredation Or-
der. Id. at 134. For example, state agencies must notify the FWS thirty days before
conducting a taking that would kill over ten percent of a given cormorant popula-
tion. Id. The FWS also retains the power to suspend or revoke state agencies'
ability to conduct takings upon a showing that the agencies failed to abide by the
Depredation Order's conditions or if the takings jeopardize the future of the cor-
morant population. Id. Lastly, the state agencies must provide the FWS with an-
nual reports of their control efforts that include a count of the cormorants and
other birds killed. Id.
137. See id. (classifying Order as subdelegation of power).
138. See id. (describing court's application of US. Telecom reasonable connec-
tion standard). For a full discussion of this standard, see supra notes 65-74 and
accompanying text.
139. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 132 (stating Second Circuit's MBTA
holding).
140. See id. at 135-37 (discussing court's APA holding). For a full discussion of
the APA, see supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text.
141. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 135-36 (detailing FWS studies). These
effects included the severe economic losses suffered by commercial fisheries. Id. at
136. For a full discussion on the adverse effects of large cormorant groupings, see
supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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sources, and the Depredation Order represents the FWS's decision
to prevent such devastating effects. 142
The Depredation Order limits cormorant takings to times
when the birds are committing or about to commit depredation.143
The Second Circuit classified this limitation as the rational connec-
tion between the cormorants' threat to nature and the FWS's deci-
sion to control them. 144 As the Supreme Court reasoned in Motor
Vehicles Manufacturers Ass'n, this connection denotes non-arbitrary
action. 145 Therefore, the FWS complied with the APA when it
adopted the Depredation Order.146
D. The FWS Did Not Violate the NEPA
The Second Circuit held that the FWS also complied with the
NEPA when it adopted the Depredation Order.147 The basis for
the plaintiffs' NEPA argument was that the order's EIS did not in-
clude site-specific analyses of the cormorant takings' effects.148 The
court held that the NEPA does not demand this level of detail in an
EIS. 149
As the Second Circuit declared in County of Suffolk, the NEPA
does not require an EIS to include every possible effect of an action
at every possible location. 50 The FWS would have had to engage in
much speculation to identify the exact sites where every taking
would occur because cormorant depredation is extremely localized
and takings are limited to cormorants committing such depreda-
tion.15 The NEPA does not require such speculation, and the
142. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 136 (discussing FWS's motivation for
passing Order).
143. See id. (detailing Order's limitations on cormorant takings). In addition
to limiting takings to cormorants committing depredation, the Depredation Order
applies only in effected states. Id. The FWS also retains the right to prevent any
taking that it determines would threaten the long-term survival of the species. Id.
144. See id. (applying rational connection test).
145. See id. (classifying FWS action as non-arbitrary). For a full discussion of
Motor Vehicles Mfts. Ass'n, see supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
146. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 137 (concluding FWS did not violate
APA).
147. See id. (stating Second Circuit's NEPA holding).
148. See id. (describing plaintiffs' NEPA challenge).
149. See id. (discussing level of EIS detail required under NEPA).
150. For a full discussion of County of Suffolk, see supra notes 94-103 and ac-
companying text.
151. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 137-38 (discussing level of speculation
necessary for site-specific analyses).
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court held that the FWS did not violate this act when it failed to
provide site-specific analyses in the Depredation Order's EIS. 15 2
V. CTcAL ANALYSIS
A. Expansion of Executive Power Dressed Up as Deference
The Second Circuit determined that the Depredation Order
did not violate the Mexico Convention simply by deferring to the
FWS's interpretation of the treaty. 1 8 The court justified its defer-
ence by appealing to case law and the "reasonableness" of the exec-
utive interpretation of the Mexico Convention. 15 4 At the same
time, however, the court acknowledged that a contrary interpreta-
tion of the treaty's close seasons requirement might have merit.'5 5
In doing so, the court recognized that the requirement might in
fact apply to cormorants.15 6 Yet, the Second Circuit chose to ignore
this possibility and simply justified giving the FWS broader power by
appealing to the idea of executive deference. 1 5 7
The status of executive deference as an optional judicial inter-
pretation technique exacerbates the court's failure to investigate
possible alternative interpretations of the Mexico Convention.158
The Supreme Court classified deference merely as a "respect ordi-
narily due" to the Executive branch.1 5 9 As discussed in Chevron,
other options, such as examining policy concerns, can aid in the
interpretation of an ambiguous treaty provision.' 60 The Second
Circuit, however, appealed only to executive deference without ever
exploring other possibilities. '6  Deference was not the Second Cir-
152. See id. at 138 (holding FWS not in violation of NEPA).
153. For a narrative analysis of the court's deference to the FWS's interpreta-
tion of the Mexico Convention, see supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
154. For a full discussion of the executive deference rule from El Al Isr. Air-
lines, see supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
155. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 134-35 (addressing opposing interpreta-
tions of Article II(A)). For a complete treatment of these arguments, see supra
note 130.
156. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 135 (recognizing possibility of Article
II(A) cormorant protection).
157. For a narrative analysis of the Second Circuit's Mexico Convention hold-
ing, see supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
158. See El Al Isr. Airlines, 525 U.S. at 168 (stating executive deference stan-
dard of treaty interpretation).
159. See id. (describing executive deference).
160. For a full discussion of Chevron, see supra notes 54-60 and accompanying
text.
161. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 134-35 (discussing court's executive def-
erence application). The plaintiffs argued that Chevron applied in this case, but
the Second Circuit dismissed the argument in a footnote without ever discussing
the other options of treaty interpretation that Chevron suggests. Id. at 135 n.3.
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cuit's only option here, but the court chose to use it to justify its
extension of executive power within the FWS.16 2
B. Hiding Government Expansion with Wordplay
The Second Circuit's decision to uphold the Depredation Or-
der under both the MBTA and the APA represents government ex-
pansion via manipulation of the English language.163 The court's
determination that the order complies with the MBTA rested on
judicial juggling of a select group of words. 164 The Second Circuit
declared that the Depredation Order was not an impermissible
"delegation" of power to state agencies, but, rather, a permissible
"subdelegation" of authority from the FWS to the agencies.165 This
seemingly creative distinction turns on the existence of "discretion-
ary limits" on the state agencies.166
The court, however, named only one such limit: the timing of
permissible takings.167 The court wildly interpreted this one limit
to represent specific limits on the species, locations, and allowable
methods of taking.168 Yet, the timing of the takings remained the
singular "discretionary limit" on state power and, consequently, the
court's decision that the Depredation Order is a "subdelegation"
rather than a "delegation" relied solely on creative judicial word-
play.169 The Second Circuit, therefore, used the English language
to allow expansion of FWS power to the state agencies under the
Depredation Order.170
The Second Circuit also relied on creative word usage to up-
hold the Depredation Order under the APA.171 This time, the
162. See id. at 135 (discussing Second Circuit's deference to FWS interpreta-
tion of Mexico Convention).
163. For a complete discussion of the court's MBTA and APA holdings, see
supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text.
164. For a full discussion of the court's MBTA holding, see supra notes 134-39
and accompanying text.
165. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 133 (classifying Order as subdelegation,
rather than delegation, of power).
166. See id. (highlighting state discretion as distinction between delegation
and subdelegation of power).
167. See id. at 133-34 (ruling cormorant takings may only occur when depre-
dation is imminent).
168. See id. at 133 (arguing Order's timing limit also limits species, means,
and areas of takings).
169. See id. (quoting Order). The Depredation Order specifically limits tak-
ings for the purpose of preventing "depredations on the public resources of fish,
wildlife, plants, and their habitats." Id. (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 21.48(c)(1) (2009)).
170. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 134 (stating court's MBTA holding).
171. See id. at 135 (declaring court's determination of non-arbitrary action by
FWS under APA).
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court classified the "discretionary limit" discussed in its MBTA hold-
ing as a "rational connection" that preempts any claim of arbitrary
or capricious action by the FWS. 1 7 2 Once again, the court used lan-
guage manipulation to inflate one aspect of the Depredation Or-
der, the time limit of takings, into a justification for government
expansion.1 73 By glorifying the taking time limit as a "rational con-
nection," the judiciary used strategic word juggling to claim APA
compliance and, accordingly, to expand government power via the
Depredation Order.1 7 4
C. The FWS's Free-for-All EIS
The Second Circuit protected the FWS's vague EIS by explain-
ing that American jurisprudence does not require high levels of
specificity in these documents.17 5 The court relied on the notion
that such a requirement would burden the FWS with excessive spec-
ulation. 7 6 The Second Circuit dramatically classified the burden as
"endless hypothesizing to remote possibilities."' 77 Earlier in its
opinion, however, the court described the detailed studies that the
FWS conducted before passing the Depredation Order.17 8
The extensive studies and preparation behind the order beg
the question of how "endless hypothesizing" could exist in deter-
mining at least some sites for cormorant takings.'79 Such intricate
preparation for the Depredation Order would prevent speculation
in the FWS's prediction of such sites.o80 Studies of cormorant
breeding and travel surely yield some indication of specific areas
172. For a full discussion of the Second Circuit's APA reasoning, see supra
notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
173. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 135 (describing Order's limit of takings
to times of depredation as rational connection, thereby making FWS's action non-
arbitrary).
174. See id. at 135-36 (describing court's APA reasoning).
175. For a narrative analysis of the court's NEPA holding, see supra notes 147-
52 and accompanying text.
176. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 137 (discussing speculation of site-spe-
cific analyses).
177. See id. (quoting County of Suffolk v. Sec'y of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1379 (2d
Cir. 1977)). For further treatment of the speculation considered in County of Suf-
folk, see supra note 103.
178. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 128-30 (describing studies and prepara-
tion conducted for Public Resource Depredation Order).
179. See id. (discussing preparation behind Order). For a full discussion of
the FWS's preparation for the Depredation Order, see supra notes 116-25 and ac-
companying text.
180. For the Second Circuit's discussion of the speculation inherent in requir-
ing site-specific analyses in the Depredation Order's EIS, see supra notes 148-52
and accompanying text.
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affected by the Depredation Order.18 1 Yet, again, the court permit-
ted the extension of executive power via the FWS.' 82 By not requir-
ing a more detailed EIS in a situation where one was surely possible,
the Second Circuit permitted the FWS to evade the NEPA and play
by its own rules. 83
VI. IMPACT
A. Broad Precedential Value
The case law upon which the Second Circuit relied in this case
foreshadows the precedential value that Fund for Animals will come
to provide for courts.184 The Second Circuit arrived at its holding
largely by appealing to cases with fact patterns substantially differ-
ent from the case before it.185 For example, ElAl IsraelAirlines was a
tort action involving a search and seizure of an airport passenger.186
Little, if any, similarities existed between this suit and the plaintiffs'
challenge of the Depredation Order, yet the court turned to this
precedent to interpret the order's compliance with the Mexico
Convention.18 7 Similarly, United States Telecom addressed a challenge
to the Telecommunications Act.188 While that case had nothing to
do with the environment, the Second Circuit used it to determine
the constitutionality of the Depredation Order's subdelegation of
authority to state fish and wildlife agencies.189
The holding in Fund for Animals, like the cases upon which the
court relied, will have broad precedential value and applicability in
a variety of cases.' 90 The Second Circuit's decision, while address-
181. See Fund for Animals, 538 F.3d at 130 (discussing FWS studies).
182. For an additional discussion of the Second Circuit's executive expansion
in the noted case, see supra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
183. For a narrative analysis of the court's NEPA holding, see supra notes 147-
52 and accompanying text.
184. For a full discussion of the precedent relied upon in the noted case, see
supra notes 49-103 and accompanying text.
185. For the factual backgrounds of cases upon which the Second Circuit re-
lied, see supra notes 49-103 and accompanying text.
186. For a complete discussion of the facts of El Al Isr. Airlines, see supra notes
49-53 and accompanying text.
187. For a narrative analysis of the Second Circuit's application of the execu-
tive deference standard from ElAlIsr. Airlines, see supra notes 126-33 and accompa-
nying text.
188. For the factual background of US. Telecom, see supra notes 65-74 and
accompanying text.
189. For a narrative analysis of the Second Circuit's application of U.S. Telecom
to the noted case, see supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
190. For a full treatment of the Second Circuit's reasoning in Fund for Ani-
mals, see supra notes 126-52 and accompanying text.
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ing a specific environmental issue, embodies broad legal principles
that can apply throughout all areas of law.191 Common law history
already shows that the legal principles in Fund for Animals have ap-
plied to varying legal scenarios.192
Judicial deference has helped determine the outcomes of a
range of cases, including employment discrimination suits.' 93 For
example, the United States Supreme Court applied this doctrine in
a class action suit brought by American employees of a Japanese
corporation.194 In arriving at its holding, the Court deferred to the
Department of State's interpretation of a treaty between the United
States and Japan because "the meaning attributed to treaty provi-
sions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation
and enforcement is entitled to great weight."' 95 Similarly, the
Court applied judicial deference to the interpretation of the 1881
treaty to determine that Yugoslavian nationals living in the United
States have the same rights to estate inheritance as their American
citizen counterparts. 9 6
Delegation of authority issues have also emerged in various
fields of law, including criminal narcotics cases.' 97 The Supreme
Court grappled with this matter after a convicted drug dealer chal-
191. For a discussion of the legal principles involved in the noted case, see
supra notes 49-103 and accompanying text.
192. For detailed treatment of the common law precedent the court used in
the noted case, see supra notes 49-103 and accompanying text.
193. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 178 (1982) (pro-
viding basis of employment discrimination case). American employees of a Japa-
nese trading company argued that the company had discriminatory hiring
practices. Id. The employees brought the class action suit, alleging that the com-
pany only hired male Japanese citizens for executive, managerial, and sales posi-
tions. Id.
194. See id. (discussing Court's application of deference to State Department's
interpretation of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty).
195. See id. at 184-85 (citing Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961)). For
a discussion of Kolovrat v. Oregon, see infra note 196 and accompanying text.
196. See Kolovrat, 366 U.S. at 188-91 (providing factual background of case).
The next of kin of two decedents, who died without a will, sought to claim their
inheritance. Id. at 188. The relatives were Yugoslavian nationals living in the
United States, and their inheritance was property located in Oregon. Id. Oregon
law prohibited aliens from claiming such an inheritance. Id. The Supreme Court,
however, deferred to the State Department's interpretation of the 1881 Treaty be-
tween the United States and Serbia and held that the nationals had the same rights
in their inheritance as they would have if they were American citizens. Id. at 195.
197. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 507-12 (1974) (detailing case's
factual background). The Executive Assistant to a state Attorney General ordered
a wiretap of Giordano's communications to his narcotics customer. Id. at 508-09.
Giordano challenged this wiretap, arguing that the delegation of authority to or-
der the wiretap to the Attorney General's Executive Assistant was unconstitutional.
Id. at 508. The Supreme Court ultimately agreed with Giordano. Id.
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lenged the government's delegation of the power to wiretap his
communications to officials other than the Attorney Genera"198
Likewise, arbitrariness concerns have been present across a spec-
trum of cases, including labor union conflicts. 199 In one such case,
the Supreme Court set aside an Interstate Commerce Commission
order because the Commission "failed to articulate any rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made."200 Arbi-
trariness has also found a place in construction law. 2 0 1 The Second
Circuit addressed this issue when it upheld the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration's approval for an airport construction project because
it was not arbitrary or capricious. 2 0 2 Common law demonstrates the
broad applicability of the legal principles of judicial deference, del-
egation of authority, and arbitrariness. 203 The Second Circuit also
proved the wide functionality of these principles in Fund for Ani-
mals, as the court relied upon factually different cases to arrive at its
holding.204 Future courts can continue to do the same and will ap-
ply Fund for Animals to a large variety of conflicts that come before
them.205
B. Encouragement of Governmental Expansion
Coinciding with Fund for Animals' capacity for broad applica-
tion is the case's potential to encourage further expansion of gov-
198. See id. at 512-14 (describing Supreme Court's reasoning).
199. Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 158-64 (1962) (detail-
ing case's factual background). Trucking companies and their labor union chal-
lenged an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission that granted Burlington
permission to conduct business within the union's designated business area. Id. at
163-64. The Commission's action was in response to the union's boycott against
another union. Id. at 159.
200. See id. at 167 (stating Court's holding). The Court declared that the
Commission did not base its decision on any proper analysis. Id. The Court held
that the Commission's action violated the APA. Id.
201. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. FAA, 564 F.3d 549, 551-52 (2d Cir.
2009) (describing factual background of case). In this case, the FAA approved an
airport construction project in Bay County, Florida. Id. at 551. The NRDC chal-
lenged the FAA's action as arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, in violation of
the APA. Id.
202. See id. at 551-52 (discussing Second Circuit's determination of FAA ac-
tion as non-arbitrary).
203. For a full discussion of these legal principles, see supra notes 48-103 and
accompanying text.
204. For a complete discussion of the precedent relied upon in Fund for Ani-
mals, see supra notes 49-103 and accompanying text.
205. For a narrative analysis of Fund for Animals, see supra notes 126-52 and
accompanying text.
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ernment powers. 206 The Second Circuit's promotion of executive
power is evident in its deferential interpretation of the Mexico Con-
vention and its leniency toward the FWS's NEPA compliance. 207 As
a result of the judiciary's agreement with the Executive branch in
this case, the FWS received broad authority over the double-crested
cormorant population.208
Fund for Animals represents judicial vesting of more power in
the Executive branch in just one field of law, environmental regula-
tion.209 Becaluse of the broad precedential value of this case, how-
ever, future courts will be able to rely on this decision tojustify their
own expansion of executive powers in a variety of cases. 210 For ex-
ample, the Second Circuit has already relied on the case's reason-
ing to expand executive power in the context of construction
law.2 1 1 The broad scope of this case's holding is thus likely to cause
executive expansion across the law, not simply within the environ-
mental segment. 212 The Second Circuit's decision in Fund for Ani-
mals has the potential to cause a disruption in the balance of power
so threatening and democratically absurd that only one colloquial-
ism can aptly describe it: for the birds.
Lauren B. Murray*
206. For a critical analysis of the noted case's expansion of executive power,
see supra notes 153-83 and accompanying text.
207. For a complete discussion of executive deference in the noted case, see
supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text. For a thorough treatment of the Sec-
ond Circuit's NEPA analysis, see supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
208. For a full narrative analysis of the noted case, see supra notes 126-52 and
accompanying text.
209. For a critical analysis of the noted case as an expansion of executive
power, see supra notes 153-83 and accompanying text.
210. For a discussion of the precedential value of Fund for Animals, see supra
notes 184-205 and accompanying text.
211. For a discussion of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. FAA, see supra
notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
212. For a complete treatment of the noted case's precedential potential, see
supra notes 184-205 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Villanova University School of Law; B.B.A., 2008, Uni-
versity of Notre Dame.
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